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ABSTRACT The goal of this paper is to determine whether managers of Croatian 
mandatory pension funds have displayed investment skill on a risk-adjusted basis during 
the 2005-2014 period. We have calculated various risk-adjusted investment performance 
measures and have then used a number of statistical tools to test the significance of the 
results. Evidence from our analysis suggests that Croatian mandatory pension funds have 
reached their investment targets in terms of risk-free rates or benchmarks. Evidence of 
investment skill was found in some of the funds analysed. 
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1. intrOductiOn
While performance attribution seeks to identify and quantify the sources of an ac-
count’s performance relative to its benchmark, the goal of performance appraisal is to 
provide evidence of investment skill. Feibel (2003, p. 203) defines investment skill as “the 
ability to deliver value- added above the benchmark over time in a statistically significant 
manner”. Performance appraisal should take into account that investors are risk averse 
and need additional expected return in order to take on additional risk. Hence, we should 
adjust portfolio performance for risk. In performance appraisal analysis, we generally mea-
sure risk as the account’s total risk, measured by its standard deviation, or its market (sys-
tematic) risk, measured by its beta. 
If the efficient market hypothesis holds true, active investment management can-
not add any value for investors (Coggin et al., 1993). Therefore, the only rational choice 
for a plan sponsor would be to invest in a passively managed market index. As there are 
many actively managed pension funds, it is not surprising that numerous researchers, 
particularly in the USA, have analysed the performance of pension funds (e.g. Brinson et 
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al. (1986), Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000), Hoernemann et al. (2005)). To summarize, there 
seems to be little evidence for superior performance of US pension funds relative to pas-
sive benchmarks. As regards pension funds in the UK, Blake and Board (2000) concluded 
that there was “no evidence of superior performance from active fund management that 
was capable of being sustained over the long life of a pension plan”. Likewise, Ammann 
and Zingg (2009) found no evidence of persistence in the performance of Swiss pension 
funds and investment foundations. Gallo (2008), on a sample of Italian pension funds, 
found that “the pension funds do not represent an efficient alternative to the TFR provi-
sion” but also found that “a strategy of buying-and-holding on the market portfolio would 
have represented a more efficient alternative to the TFR.”1 
Less literature is available when emerging or frontier markets are concerned. Anto-
lin (2008) brings a broad overview of pension funds from many countries around the 
world. The main conclusion from this report is that privately managed pension funds 
“have obtained a positive premium given the level risk when comparing at least with the 
short-term alternative investment instrument”. In contrast to papers dealing with more 
mature markets, Stanko (2002) concluded that the gross investment results for the pen-
sion fund market in Poland were satisfactory “because the market as a whole and half of 
the existing sample produced significantly positive results”. However, the analysis cov-
ered a period of only three years. As far as Croatia is concerned, to our knowledge, only 
two papers have scrutinized the performance of pension funds. Matek and Radaković 
(2015) found that the average mandatory pension fund manager in Croatia added 77 
basis points annually to the return of a benchmark portfolio over the 2005-2014 pe-
riod. Novaković (2015) also concluded that Croatian pension funds outperformed their 
benchmarks, even on a risk-adjusted basis. 
Performance appraisal of mandatory pension funds in Croatia is worth undertaking 
for several reasons. Firstly, research on the topic is an objective contribution to the on-
going public debate on the merits of the pension reform. In our opinion, results of perfor-
mance analysis should primarily be the basis for strategic decisions about the investment 
process within fund management companies. Unfortunately, it is often misinterpreted 
and misused as a “proof” of futility of the pension reform and an argument to return to a 
one-pillar “pay as you go” government sponsored model. We believe that the performance 
results of privately managed pension funds are in no case a proof of superiority of the “pay 
as you go” system. The fact is that this system has been supplemented by privately managed 
second and third pillar pension funds because of its long-term demographic unsustainabil-
ity, not because of its poor investment performance (if there is any at all). Secondly, this 
paper is a logical extension to the work presented in Matek and Radaković (2015). In “Is 
Active Management of Mandatory Pension Funds in Croatia Creating Value for Second 
Pillar Fund Members?” Matek and Radaković have evidenced positive results from active 
management. This paper puts these results in a risk-adjusted context. Finally, publicly 
scrutinizing performance and portfolios of mandatory pension funds could spur efforts to 
improve the investment process within the management companies. 
1 The TFR is a government guaranteed scheme based on a quote of monthly salary retained by the em-
ployer and linked to inflation. 
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The paper consists of six chapters. Following the introduction, we give a short over-
view of the second pillar pension system in Croatia. The next chapter describes the meth-
odological issues and choices we have made in collecting data for the analysis. The fourth 
chapter presents the results of the calculation of the most common risk-adjusted perfor-
mance measures. In the fifth chapter, we present tests for statistical significance of the 
investment results. Finally, in the conclusion we give a summary of our findings regarding 
evidence on the existence of investment skill in the management of Croatian mandatory 
pension funds. 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE PENSION SYSTEM IN CROATIA
In 2002, a pension system reform in Croatia introduced second and third pillar pri-
vately managed mandatory and voluntary pension funds to complement the existing gov-
ernment-sponsored first pillar “pay as you go” system. The second pillar consists of manda-
tory “defined contribution” pension funds where employers divert a certain percentage of 
each employee’s monthly gross salary into the pension fund. Pension fund members assume 
the investment risk until retirement. At retirement, they transfer the capital that they have 
accumulated to a specialized insurance company and become entitled to a life-long annuity. 
Today, the mandatory pension funds’ market consists of four management compa-
nies. Until 2014, each of these companies managed one pension fund and all the partici-
pants were assuming the same risk profile. A proxy life-cycle model introduced in 2014 
saw the creation of three mandatory pension fund categories with different risk profiles: 
models A, B and C. Each of the management companies must offer all three models to the 
system participants. Our analysis covers only investment results of model B funds because 
they are clearly the successors of the funds created in 2002, in terms of both investment 
strategy and assets under management. The fund management companies employ their 
own fund managers and invest funds’ assets actively across various asset classes. Although 
the investment results of the four pension funds vary greatly, the sensitivity of pension 
fund members to performance is very low. This is evidenced by the extremely low partici-
pation of new fund members in the choice of their fund (around 95% of newly employed 
persons are automatically attributed to a fund management company because they do not 
choose their fund at employment) and the extremely low rate of switches from one fund to 
another by existing fund members. Through mandatory pension funds, Croatian citizens 
have gradually built up individual pension assets invested in capital markets. Mandatory 
pension funds had 1.7 million members at the end of 2014 and their assets (8.65 billion 
of euros) represented almost 20% of the GDP of Croatia.  
3. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND CHOICES 
For our analysis, we have used the data set of monthly gross of fees returns for pen-
sion funds constructed in Matek and Radaković (2015). According to Bacon (2008, p. 
34) monthly returns are dominantly used as the industry standard. Other authors like 
Coggin et al. (1993) or Gallo (2008) also use monthly returns. The period analysed covers 
10 years from January 2005 to December 2014. We believe that “gross of fees” returns are 
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more appropriate for this analysis for at least two reasons: for the comparability between 
benchmark and pension fund returns and the comparability between funds themselves 
across the same or different periods. As an additional argument, the level of fees is set 
administratively and is beyond the influence of the portfolio managers. 
The analysis covers all four mandatory pension funds i.e. 100% of the market from 
January 2005 to July 2014. After the introduction of three categories of funds in August 
2014, we considered funds B to be the successors of the previous funds because 97.3% 
of the assets remained in funds B and they were the most similar to the previous funds in 
terms of investment policy. Due to their very short life span, our analysis does not cover 
the returns of funds A and C. We have given the following codes to the four funds anal-
ysed: AZ, EP, PC and RB.   
In order to compute risk-adjusted measures of performance, we needed a proxy for 
the risk-free rate of return and appropriate benchmarks. Many issues arise when determin-
ing the risk-free rate for Croatian funds: 
•	 the rating of long-term government debt is below investment grade,
•	 most domestic government bonds are indexed to the euro/kuna exchange rate, 
•	 from time to time short-term kuna rates undergo periods of extreme volatility, 
•	 the major part of the funds’ assets is invested in foreign currency instruments (pre-
dominantly euro-denominated) although the NAV of the funds is quoted in kunas, 
•	 Croatian mandatory pension funds’ assets under management are several times 
higher than the total amount of Croatian Treasury bills issued. 
After having taken all of this into consideration, we finally opted to use kuna short-
term rates as a proxy for the risk-free rate rather than short-term euro rates. We chose 
to conduct our analysis using two data sets: 3-months Croatian Treasury bill rates at the 
weekly auction date nearest to the beginning of the month and 1-month Zagreb inter-
bank offered rates (ZIBOR) at the first business day of each month. We have given the 
code RF1 to the 3-months T-bill rates and the code RF2 to the 1-month ZIBOR rates. 
Although the investment horizon of pension funds is intrinsically long-term, we consider 
short-term rates better suited than long-term rates for the risk-free rate because the is-
sues of kuna bonds are scarce and the term premium tends to be quite high. Anyway, the 
choice of the risk-free rate does not affect the ranking of funds’ risk-adjusted performance 
making this discussion more academic than practical. It is interesting to note that Antolin 
(2008, p. 12), faced with a similar dilemma decided to use four alternative specifications 
for the risk-free asset: a short-term local rate, a long-term local rate, a short-term US rate 
(T-bill) and a long-term US rate (T-bonds). 
We have used four different benchmarks in our analysis. The benchmark B1 refers to 
the pension funds’ historical asset allocation between asset classes while the benchmark B2 
refers to the regulatory asset allocation as described in Matek and Radaković (2015). The 
benchmark B3 is the “gross of fees” Mirex2. Finally, the benchmark B4 is the “gross of fees” 
return of the average fund (arithmetic average return of pension funds). 
2  Mirex is the official asset-weighted index of returns of pension funds calculated by HANFA. 
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Table 1 summarizes key performance and risk indicators used in calculations in 
Chapter 4. 
table 1
Returns, standard deviations and market share for Croatian mandatory pension funds from 2005 
to 2014 (%)
AZ EP PC RB B1 B2 B3 B4 RF1 RF2
6.23 6.15 4.85 5.87 5.13 5.52 5.89 5.77 3.07 3.77
4.40 5.36 4.88 4.44 6.16 5.15 4.48 4.63 0.51 0.96
40 13 17 30 - - - - - -
1 annual arithmetic mean return 
2 annualized standard deviation
3 average market share 
Sources: www.mfin.hr for T-bills returns, Bloomberg for ZIBOR, www.hanfa.hr, Matek and 
Radaković (2015) and authors’ calculations for pension funds’ returns
Which benchmark is best suited for performance analysis depends on the perfor-
mance measure that is used. However, it is clear that none fulfils all of the criteria for a 
good benchmark: some have not been defined in advance (B1), their structure is not al-
ways known in advance (B1, B3, B4), they are not investible (B3, B4) etc. Our perception 
is that B2 might be the best suited to assess the statistical significance of the investment 
results of the fund. An underlying assumption of that conclusion is that the regulatory 
investment limits are in line with the long-term risk-return profile of the pension funds. 
Figure 1 shows the annualized cumulative value added of the four pension funds com-
pared to B2. We can see that although they are highly correlated, funds have distinctive 
periods of under or over performance. This is in line with the conclusion from Matek and 
Radaković (2015) that active management of Croatian pension funds has significantly 
influenced the performance results.    
Another factor affecting the comparability of returns is the use of hold-to-maturity 
portfolios. Regulation allows Croatian pension funds to use HTM portfolios where assets 
are valued at amortized cost rather than market prices. This has an obvious impact on both 
the reported returns and the volatility of the funds. We have not undergone the tedious 
task of re-pricing portfolios of all the funds and recalculated their returns. Our educated 
guess would be that the results of such a re-pricing would not have a decisive influence on 
the results of the analysis. The main rationale behind that argument is that management 
companies were not using HTM portfolios continuously or on a massive scale. In addi-
tion, it is clear from Matek and Radaković (2015) that most of the value-added by active 
management stems from investments in Croatian equity rather than Croatian government 
bonds. 
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figure 1 
Cumulative “gross-of-fees” annualized value-added of Croatian pension funds against benchmark 
B2 (2005-2014)
Source: author’s calculations 
4. risK-adJusted perfOrmance measures
We can classify risk-adjusted performance measures into two main categories: mea-
sures based on total risk and measures based on systematic or market risk. Total risk is usu-
ally measured by the standard deviation of returns, or some downside deviation measure. 
Market risk is usually measured by beta. Criticisms of risk-adjusted measures described in 
Feibel (2003) are valid here too: 
•	 it is questionable whether assets are valued according to the CAPM or some other 
model, 
•	 the use of different market indices as surrogates for the market portfolio can pro-
duce significantly different conclusions about performance, and
•	 ex-post calculations are only estimates of the true parameters, which are often 
unstable (e.g., the aggressiveness of the portfolio manager may change rapidly). 
It is important to bear in mind that Croatian government bonds dominate the port-
folios of mandatory pension funds. In practice, this means that due to the exposure to this 
specific risk, total risk might be significantly underestimated.    
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However, despite all the shortcomings of risk-adjusted measures, we believe that they 
give a valuable insight into the quality of the portfolio management process and allow us 
to rank the funds accordingly.  
4.1. Sharpe ratio 
In order to compare the risk to return efficiency of two or more portfolios, we could 
simply divide the average return over a period by the standard deviation of returns. The 
Sharpe ratio, also known as reward-to-variability ratio, slightly modifies that concept by 
introducing the idea that we should not be able to earn returns over a risk-free rate with-
out taking on risk.
Traditionally, the formula for the ex-post Sharpe ratio is: 
 ( 1 )
where:
 is the Sharpe ratio, 
 is the annual arithmetic mean return of the portfolio,
 is the annual arithmetic mean risk-free return, and
 is the annualized standard deviation of the portfolio’s returns. 
The annual arithmetic mean return of the portfolio and risk-free asset are calculated 
by multiplying the average monthly return by 12. 
A manager with a higher Sharpe ratio is producing more average return relative to the 
risk-free rate per unit of volatility than a manager with a lower Sharpe ratio is. A negative 
Sharpe ratio implies that the manager has not even been able to earn the risk-free rate. The 
Sharpe ratio is best used to compare portfolios with similar risk characteristics over the 
same period. Different time spans and different choices of return frequency and risk-free 
rates will yield different returns. 
According to data presented in Table 1, all four Croatian mandatory pension funds 
have achieved higher returns than the proxies we have used for the risk-free asset. The 
3-months Treasury bills have yielded an annual arithmetic mean return of 3.07% with 
an annualized standard deviation of returns of 0.51% while the 1-month ZIBOR aver-
age annual arithmetic mean return over the same period was 3.77% with an annualized 
standard deviation of 0.96%. The annual arithmetic mean return of the best yielding fund 
(AZ) was 6.23% while the worst performing fund (PC) had an annual arithmetic mean 
return of 4.85%. We can also see that AZ was the best performing fund in terms of both 
return and risk (measured as the standard deviation of monthly returns). This resulted in 
the highest Sharpe ratio. The EP fund ranked second in terms of return but came third in 
terms of Sharpe ratio due to a higher standard deviation of monthly returns. 
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table 2
Sharpe ratios and rankings for Croatian mandatory pension funds (2005-2014)
Pension fund Ranking
RF1 RF2
AZ 0.72 0.56 1
EP 0.57 0.44 3
PC 0.36 0.22 4
RB 0.63 0.47 2
Sources: authors’ calculations 
In our opinion, from the perspective of a fund member paying mandatory monthly 
contributions to the fund and for whom it is not allowed to exit the system before re-
tirement, the utility of the standard deviation of monthly returns as a risk measure is 
questionable. Furthermore, a money-weighted rather than a time-weighted rate of return 
would probably be a more appropriate basis for any meaningful risk-adjusted performance 
calculation. On the other hand, from the perspective of the fund manager, all else being 
equal, a lower standard deviation of periodical returns reflects higher investment skill 
compared to a higher standard deviation. 
4.2. Sortino ratio
The Sortino ratio is a modification of the Sharpe ratio that uses the downside devia-
tion as a denominator and a target return as the hurdle rate in the numerator instead of 
the risk-free rate. 




 is the Sortino ratio, 
 is the annual arithmetic mean target return,
 is the return of the portfolio in period i,
 is the target return in period i, 
 is the total number of measurement periods, and
 is the number of periods per year. 
The Sortino ratio accommodates for two criticisms of the Sharpe ratio. Firstly, we 
intuitively feel that we should take differently into account volatility created by losses 
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and volatility created by gains. Secondly, standard deviation measures risk relative to the 
mean return, while investors may consider as risky returns that fall below some periodic 
minimum acceptable return or target return. The target return can be a fixed percentage 
or a floating value, e.g. zero, the return of a market benchmark, or the actuarially assumed 
rate of return.
The above-mentioned criticisms of the Sharpe ratio are particularly relevant when 
the returns are not normally distributed (when returns are normally distributed, rankings 
of portfolios based on upside and downside risks will be the same) or if the investor has 
a target return that is different from the mean return. However, the Sortino ratio is not 
prone to flaws itself: because downside deviation is calculated, using the actual history 
of fund returns over the period analysed, it can be very sensitive to the number of return 
observations and the period selected. 
In our analysis, we have used the rate of inflation increased by a margin of 200 basis 
points per year as the target rate. The rationale behind this choice is that a long-term aver-
age return of 200 basis points above the annual rate of inflation was unofficially set as a 
target at the beginning of the pension reform (Bejaković, 2012). As the input for inflation 
rates, we have used the month on month consumer price index as published by the Croa-
tian Statistical Bureau. The annual arithmetic mean return for inflation is 2.41% (2.42% 
annually expressed as the compounded monthly inflation rate) which sets the target rate 
at the annual arithmetic mean return of 4.35% (4.42% annually expressed as the com-
pounded monthly target rate). As can be seen in Table 3, all the funds have managed to 
outperform the “unofficial” target return. 
As noted by Feibel (2003, p. 200), by ranking portfolios by the Sortino ratio rather 
than the Sharpe ratio, we might find that portfolios appearing to be the most efficient us-
ers of risk are not as appropriate investments for a particular situation as others. However, 
this is not the case for Croatian pension funds where rankings compared to the Sharpe 
ratio have remained the same. The only difference is that AZ and RB have switched places 
in terms of observed risk. 
table 3
Annual excess returns (%), downside deviations (%), Sortino ratios and rankings for Croatian man-
datory pension funds (2005-2014)
Pension fund Annualized downside deviation Ranking
AZ 1.88 3.47 0.54 1
EP 1.80 4.35 0.41 3
PC 0.50 4.15 0.12 4
RB 1.52 3.42 0.44 2
Sources: www.dzs.hr for monthly CPI, www.hanfa.hr and authors’ calculations for pension funds’ 
returns
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4.3. Information ratio 
If we want to compare the risk-adjusted return of a portfolio and its benchmark, we 
can compute the Sharpe ratio for the benchmark and for the account. A higher Sharpe ra-
tio for the account than for the benchmark indicates superior performance. Another way 
to approach this problem is to use the Information ratio. The Information ratio is a modi-
fication of the Sharpe ratio that incorporates both risk-adjusted returns and a benchmark. 
The formula for the Information ratio is: 
 ( 3 )
where: 
 is the Information ratio, 
 is the annual arithmetic mean return of the benchmark, and 
 is the annualized standard deviation of the difference between the returns on the 
portfolio and the returns on the benchmark. 
The Information ratio measures the reward earned by the account manager per incre-
mental unit of risk created by deviating from the benchmark’s holdings. The numerator 
is often referred to as the active return and the denominator is referred to as the active 
risk or tracking error. As described by Feibel (2003, p. 202) the term Information ratio 
refers to the idea that the manager would depart from the benchmark only if he had some 
special information not already priced into the market, which presumably would lead to 
value-added over the benchmark return. An annualized Information ratio above one, us-
ing a long enough series of observations, is commonly interpreted as an indication of skill 
on behalf of the investment manager. A ratio of 0.5 is considered an adequate measure. A 
negative Information ratio indicates that a fund underperformed its benchmark.
In our opinion, B1 and B2 are not quite adequate for the calculation of the Informa-
tion ratio, as these benchmarks were not defined in advance. The Mirex might be more 
appropriate in this context. Firstly, because it is publicly available. Secondly, because it is 
used as the benchmark for the activation of the guarantee scheme: according to Croatian 
regulation, if a type B fund underperforms the three years return of the Mirex for more 
than 600 basis points at the end of any calendar year, the management company will 
refund the members for the difference. Although the structure of the Mirex is also not 
fully available in advance, portfolio managers can approximate it using publicly available 
data on portfolio composition and are motivated not to deviate too much from the asset 
weighted portfolio composition of their peers. However, the Mirex being composed of the 
four funds we are analysing, its use has itself numerous flaws.  
As can be seen from Table 1, all funds with the exception of PC have managed to 
beat benchmarks B1, B2 and B4. PC and RB have underperformed the B3 benchmark, 
although RB underperformed it for only two basis points. The results of our calculations 
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of the Information ratio are shown in Table 4. None of the portfolio managers recorded 
an Information ratio above 1. In fact, all the Information ratios were below 0.5. In terms 
of ranking, EP ranked first when compared with benchmarks B1 and B2. This is due to 
lower tracking error. AZ ranked first when compared with benchmarks B3 and B4. This 
is does not come as a surprise because AZ has a dominant market position and therefore 
influences very significantly the performance of the Mirex index. For the same reason, the 
two largest funds, AZ and RB recorded the lowest tracking errors in relation to B3.  
table 4
Tracking error (%), Information ratios and rankings for Croatian mandatory pension funds (2005-2014)
Fund TR* irp Rn TR* irp Rn TR* irp Rn TR* irp Rn
B1 B2 B3 B4
AZ 3.08 0.36 2 2.27 0.31 2 0.95 0.36 1 1.22 0.37 1
EP 2.28 0.45 1 2.01 0.31 1 1.61 0.16 2 1.31 0.29 2
PC 2.67 -0.11 4 2.32 -0,29 4 1.27 -0.82 4 1.04 -0.89 4
RB 3.22 0.23 3 2.48 0.14 3 1.14 -0.01 3 1.26 0.08 3
* annualized tracking error
Sources: www.hanfa.hr; Matek and Radaković (2015) and authors’ calculations for pension funds’ 
and benchmark returns
4.4. m2 
The fourth measure we are considering also uses the standard deviation as a measure of 
risk. M2, named after its authors Franco and Leah Modigliani, is the mean incremental return 
over a market index of a hypothetical portfolio formed by combining the account with bor-
rowing or lending at the risk-free rate in order to match the standard deviation of the market 
index. In other words, M2 measures what the account would have earned if it had taken on the 
same total risk as the market index, where the total risk of the account is rescaled by borrowing 
(to increase the level of risk) or lending (to decrease the total risk) at the risk-free rate. A skilful 
manager will generate an M2 value that exceeds the return on the benchmark.
The formula for M2 is: 
 ( 4 )
where: 
is the M2 return, and
 is the annualized standard deviation of the benchmark. 
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Since we have used two different measures for the risk-free rate and four different 
benchmarks, we have calculated as much as eight M2 returns for each of the four manda-
tory pension funds. 
As we can see in Table 5, the choice of benchmark or risk-free rate did not influence 
the results in terms of ranking and, as expected, produced the same conclusions as using 
the Sharpe ratio. However, it did influence the assessment of skill, when we compare M2 
to the annual return of benchmark portfolios.  
table 5
M2 returns (%) and rankings for Croatian mandatory pension funds (2005-2014)
Annual return of benchmark portfolios
B1 B2 B3 B4
Ranking
5.13 5.52 5.89 5.77
Fund m2 using RF1
AZ 7.49 6.77 6.29 6.40 1
EP 6.61 6.03 5.64 5.73 3
PC 5.31 4.95 4.70 4.76 4
RB 6.95 6.32 5.89 5.99 2
Fund m2 using RF2
AZ 7.21 6.65 6.27 6.36 1
EP 6.50 6.06 5.76 5.83 3
PC 5.13 4.91 4.76 4.79 4
RB 6.68 6.20 5.89 5.96 2
Sources: www.mfin.hr for T-bill auction results, Bloomberg for ZIBOR rates, www.hanfa.hr, Matek 
and Radaković (2015) and authors’ calculations for pension funds’ and benchmark returns
4.5. Jensen’s alpha 
Jensen’s alpha, also known as ex-post alpha, uses systematic risk (beta) rather than total 
risk (standard deviation) for the calculation of risk-adjusted performance. The formula for the 
calculation of the ex-post alpha is derived from an ex-post version of the CAPM relationship: 
 ( 5 )
where:
 is the annual average Jensen’s alpha, and
 is the beta of the portfolio relative to the benchmark. 
The beta of the portfolio relative to its benchmark is the covariance of the fund and 
benchmark excess returns over the risk free rate divided by the variance of the benchmark 
excess returns. 
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According to Feibel (2003, p. 197), the Jensen’s alpha is the excess return not pre-
dicted by the CAPM equation. In other words, Jensen’s alpha is the factor that reconciles 
actual returns to those predicted by the CAPM. Positive alpha is a sign of a portfolio 
manager’s skill. If alpha is greater than zero, the fund had a return higher than expected 
by the CAPM. A negative alpha indicates that the fund performed worse than predicted 
given the market risk taken. 
Table 6 shows the results of our calculations for Jensen’s alpha with RF1 and bench-
marks B1 and B2. We are not showing here results using B3 or B4 because we do not find 
these benchmarks appropriate for Jensen’s alpha calculation. This is particularly true for 
the Mirex index where fund’s performance is not only partially calculated against itself, 
but where as much as 40% (in case of fund AZ) of the index constitutes of one fund’s own 
performance. 
table 6
Jensen’s alpha (%) and rankings for Croatian mandatory pension funds (2005-2014)
B1 B2
Fund beta Annual Jensen’s alpha Ranking beta Annual Jensen’s alpha Ranking
AZ 0.64 1.84% 1 0.77 1.26% 1
EP 0.81 1.40% 3 0.96 0.71% 3
PC 0.73 0,28% 4 0.85 -0.32% 4
RB 0.63 1.50% 2 0.77 0.93% 2
Sources: www.mfin.hr for T-bill auction results, www.hanfa.hr, Matek and Radaković (2015) and 
authors’ calculations for pension funds’ and benchmark returns
The choice of benchmark used did not affect rankings. Fund AZ exhibits the highest 
Jensen’s alpha while fund PC exhibits the lowest alpha. Jensen’s alpha for fund PC is nega-
tive when compared to B2. 
4.6. Treynor measure 
The Treynor measure also relates an account’s excess returns to the systematic risk 
assumed by the account. The calculation of the Treynor measure, also known as reward-
to-volatility or excess return to non-diversifiable risk is: 
 ( 6 )
where:
 is the Treynor measure.
The results of our calculations of the Treynor measure for B1 and B2 using RF1 are 
shown in Table 7. 
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table 7
Treynor measure (%) and rankings for Croatian mandatory pension funds (2005-2014)
B1 B2
Fund beta Treynor measure Ranking beta Treynor measure Ranking
AZ 0.64 4.96% 1 0.77 4.08% 1
EP 0.81 3.78% 3 0.96 3.18% 3
PC 0.73 2.44% 4 0.85 2.07% 4
RB 0.63 4.43% 2 0.77 3.66% 2
Sources: www.mfin.hr for T-bill auction results, www.hanfa.hr, Matek and Radaković (2015) and 
authors’ calculations for pension funds’ and benchmark returns
4.7. Summary of results 
Jensen’s alpha and the Treynor measure will always give the same assessment of the 
existence of investment skill. However, it is possible that measures of risk-adjusted per-
formance based on systematic risk produce opposite conclusions compared to measures 
based on total risk. This is most likely to happen if the manager takes on a large amount of 
non-systematic risk. Increased non-systematic risk will increase the total risk but will leave 
the systematic risk unchanged. Consequently, this will produce a lower Sharpe ratio and 
M2 but will have no impact on the Treynor measure or Jensen’s alpha. 
In the case of Croatian pension funds, the Sharpe, Sortino, M2, Jensen’s alpha and 
Treynor measures all gave the same rankings in terms of risk-adjusted performance. The 
only exception is the Information ratio where results were different from the other mea-
sures and changed when we applied different benchmarks: when compared to B1 and B2, 
fund EP exhibited the best results, but it was ranked second when we applied B3 and B4. 
Fund RB ranked second with all measures except the Information ratio where it ranked 
third. This result is very interesting when considering that fund EP had an average annual 
return much higher than fund RB. Fund PC consistently ranks fourth. Table 8 summa-
rizes the results described above.
table 8  






B1, B2 B3, B4
AZ 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
EP 3 3 1 2 3 3 3
PC 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
RB 2 2 3 3 2 2 2
Sources: authors’ calculations 
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5. ASSESSING THE EXISTENCE OF SKILL
According to Feibel (2003, p. 203) “skill can be defined as the ability to deliver value-
added above the benchmark over time in a statistically significant manner”. We need to observe 
performance over many periods to be able to say that there is some evidence of investment skill. 
It is important to note three important shortcomings of such statistical analysis. Firstly, even 
when results show evidence of skill, it is possible that the investment results of a particular in-
vestment manager are completely due to chance. This is a fact inherent to the investment pro-
cess itself. Secondly, we need very long series of historical observations to assess performance. 
As Feibel states (2003, p. 203): “if we consider a year the shortest single period over which we 
wish to evaluate the performance of a manager, we would need many yearly returns to statisti-
cally isolate skill from luck. If we shorten the measurement period to quarters or months, we 
artificially introduce a short-term horizon into a situation where it is probably the long-term 
results that matter”. Finally, the truth is that we are using past performance to find evidence of 
past skill and superior past performance is no guarantee of skill in the future. 
Nevertheless, despite all these shortcomings, careful interpretation of results can give 
relevant insight into the quality of the portfolio management process within asset man-
agement companies. In this paper, we have used different methods to assess the existence 
of investment skill on the example of Croatian mandatory pension funds: the t-statistic, 
quality charts and runs test. 
5.1. T-statistic
As explained earlier, subtracting the periodic benchmark returns from the funds’ re-
turn will give us the value-added. We can quantify whether or not the value-added was 
significant (or not) by calculating the t-statistic for the value-added. To do this, we set up 
the null hypothesis that the manager has added no value over the period; the alternative 
hypothesis is that the manager did add value, and we then use the t-statistic to try to prove 
the null hypothesis false. The formula for the t-statistic is:
 ( 7 )
where: 
 is the t-statistic,
 is the arithmetic mean monthly return of the portfolio,
 is the arithmetic mean monthly return of the benchmark, and 
 is the standard deviation of the difference between the monthly returns on the port-
folio and the returns on the benchmark. 
Table 9 shows the results of our calculations of the t-statistic. With a significance level 
of 5% and 119 degrees of freedom, we would reject the null hypothesis if the t-statistic 
had a value lower than -1.9801 or higher than 1.9801. Because it is not, we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis for B1 and B2 for any fund. When B3 and B4 are considered, for fund 
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PC, we can reject the null-hypothesis that the manager has added no value over the period 
i.e. that the results are due to chance. In fact, since the results are negative, and the results 
are statistically significant, we can say that the manager of fund PC has negative skill when 
compared to its peer group benchmarks B3 and B4. 
table 9
T-statistic for Croatian mandatory pension funds (2005-2014) at 95% confidence level
Fund B1 B2 B3 B4
AZ 1.1275 0.9863 1.1353 1.1822
EP 1.4117 0.9900 0.5144 0.9042
PC -0.3357 -0.9160 -2.5946 -2.8066
RB 0.7248 0.4473 -0.0470 0.2416
Sources: authors’ calculations 
There are two problems with the calculation and the interpretation of t-statistics. 
Firstly, we intuitively understand that we should be interested in the performance of a 
fund over single periods longer than a month. Secondly, there is a problem with non-
stationarity, as the statistics calculated will not remain stable if in the following period 
portfolio managers dramatically outperform or underperform their benchmarks. In our 
opinion, the t-statistic as calculated above primarily demonstrates that pension funds have 
not implemented an investment strategy designed in a way that consistently creates value 
added over the benchmark return on a monthly basis. Since the investment horizon of a 
pension fund is typically longer than 10 years this does not come as a surprise. The inter-
pretation of the t-statistic in case of B3 and B4 is not clear-cut either, in particular for B3 
where larger funds have a larger weight in B3 and will automatically perform closer to B3. 
5.2. Quality Control Charts 
Besides t-statistics calculated on monthly value-added returns data, we can assess the 
statistical significance of the value-added returns generated by the pension funds’ man-
agers using cumulative data. As described in Bailey et al. (2009), one effective means of 
presenting such data is with quality control charts. 
Quality control charts in Figure 2 show the performance of the four Croatian manda-
tory pension funds versus the B2 benchmark. We have chosen B2 for our analysis because 
it has recorded the highest total return over the 10-years period analysed. Obviously, we 
could have conducted the same analysis with any other benchmark. The jagged line is the 
funds’ cumulative annualized performance relative to the benchmark. The funnel-shaped 
lines surrounding the horizontal lines form the confidence band (the annualized standard 
deviation of annualized cumulative value-added returns decreases at a rate equal to the 
square root of time, hence the funnel-shaped lines). We have chosen a 95% confidence 
band. The null hypothesis of our quality control chart is that the manager has no invest-
ment skill; thus, the expected value-added return is zero (represented by the straight hori-
zontal line emanating from the vertical axis at zero). The null hypothesis suggests that ex 
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post differences between benchmark and portfolio returns have no directional biases and 
are entirely due to random chance. 
figure 2
Quality control charts for Croatian mandatory pension funds versus a benchmark based on regula-
tory limits (2005-2014) with a 95% confidence band
Fund AZ 
Fund EP
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Besides the null hypothesis, we rely on two other assumptions: 
•	 the manager’s value-added returns are independent from period to period and 
normally distributed around the expected value of zero, and
•	 the manager’s investment process does not change from period to period implying 
that the variability of the manager’s value-added returns remains constant over 
time.
If such assumptions hold, the confidence band indicates the likely range of value-
added return results for a manager who possesses no skill. In other words, based on the 
properties of a normal distribution, we know that 1.96 standard deviations around the 
mean will capture ex ante 95% of the possible outcomes associated with a normally dis-
tributed random variable and a specified level of value-added return variability.
Based on the quality charts in Figure 1, for funds AZ, EP and PC we reject the null 
hypothesis that the manager’s expected value-added return is zero. That is, there is only 
a 5% chance that a zero-value-added return manager would produce results that lie out-
side the 95% confidence band. Investment results for funds AZ and EP have breached 
the confidence band on the upside. The unstated implication is that managers of fund 
AZ and EP have displayed investment skill during the period of our analysis. Fund PC 
pierced the confidence interval on the downside. The implication is that the manager 
is an “underperformer”. The investment results of fund RB are positive but within the 
confidence band. Hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the manager of fund 
RB has no skill. Even if the manager produced around 41 basis points annually of value-
added over the 10 years analysed, as stated in Bailey et al. (2009), “his or her talents are 
obscured by the variability of his or her short-run results”. We have also shown quality 
control charts for the Mirex (B3) and the arithmetic average fund (B4) - the results are 
inconclusive. 
Because the equity market experienced an extraordinary bull market in 2006 and 
2007, followed by an extraordinary bear market in 2008 and 2009, we excluded the first 
five years and applied the same analysis on the 2010 to 2014 period. The results of this 
alternative analysis are shown in Figure 3 with very similar results. In the 2010-2014 
period, AZ fund breached the confidence band on the upside, funds EP and RB are 
positive but within the confidence band, and fund PC breached the confidence band 
on the downside. 
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figure 3
Quality control charts for Croatian mandatory pension funds versus a benchmark based on regula-
tory limits (2010-2014) with a 95% confidence band
Fund AZ 
Fund EP
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5.3. Runs test
According to Feibel (2003, p. 207), runs tests are used to determine whether the value-
added over the benchmark is the result of a random process or there is evidence of consistency. In 
our calculations, we have first marked each monthly period according to whether there was value-
added over the period or not. We have then looked for “runs” in the data. When value-added 
remains positive or negative from one month to the next, there is a run. When it turns from posi-
tive to negative or vice versa, then there is a break in the run. Runs tests are based on the idea that 
if the pattern of value-added were random, we would expect half of the months to reverse. If there 
were periods of consistent value-added, we would expect a smaller number of reversals. We can 
divide the number of runs by the possible number of runs to derive a run ratio. A random process 
would exhibit a ratio of runs to expected runs of 0.5. A ratio near zero would indicate that there 
was a pattern of trending value-added, be it positive or negative. Although a ratio near one would 
indicate that there were no trends, the process was not entirely random either. 
Our calculations for all pension funds and for all benchmarks used in this analysis re-
sulted in ratios of runs to expected runs ranging from 0.44 to 0.57. We can conclude that 
there is no clear pattern of consistency in funds’ monthly value-added to the benchmarks 
we have selected, whether these benchmarks are based on selected asset class proxies or 
peer group returns. Such results are in line with the t-statistic tests.  
One obvious problem with the runs test as a measure of performance consistency is that 
it accounts for whether or not there was value-added, but not for the size of the value-added.
6. cOnclusiOn 
Croatian mandatory pension funds have all achieved a rate of return superior to the risk 
free-rate and have consequently exhibited positive Sharpe ratios. This is in line with the find-
ings from Antolin (2008) and Novaković (2015). They have also achieved positive Sortino 
ratios, i.e. a rate of return superior to the inflation rate increased by a margin of 2 percent-
age points per year. This rate was set as an unofficial target at the beginning of the pension 
reform (Bejaković, 2012). From that point of view, we can conclude that they have achieved 
their minimum investment targets. When comparing the returns of pension funds with the 
four benchmarks we have assigned, the results are less conclusive, but in general, we can say 
that the rates of return were on average superior to the rates of return of the four designated 
benchmarks. This is in line with the findings from Stanko (2002) but opposed to the find-
ings of other authors, which analysed returns on more mature markets. It is interesting to 
note that the adjustment for risk did not influence the rankings of the funds. This is mostly 
because the fund with the highest return also had the lowest standard deviation of monthly 
returns. The two largest funds displayed the lowest standard deviations of monthly returns, 
which is in line with our expectations because the funds’ size prevented them to achieve a 
high turnover rate and to take on specific investment bets. The two smaller funds have di-
vergent results: one displayed increased volatility and returns while the other displayed poor 
investment results combined with a relatively high standard deviation of returns. When as-
sessing the existence of investment skill, the t-statistic based on monthly returns and the runs 
test lead us to the conclusion that portfolio managers, in general, did not exhibit significant 
investment skill. However, in our analysis based on cumulative annualized returns, which 
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we find more relevant in the particular case, two or three funds, depending on the period 
observed, exhibited statistically significant results. In one case, the fund managers exhibited 
statistically significant investment skill. In another case, the results suggest lack of skill.
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